R.GEORGE PEREIRA
Vs
ST.JOSEPH'S
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY
on 8 May, 2009
The following was in pursuance of an
application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
and the Scheme for Appointment of an Arbitrator by the Chief Justice of the
Kerala High Court. The application seeks appointment of an independent and
impartial arbitrator for adjudicating upon the various claims of the applicant
against the respondent.
Facts of the case:
The applicant was a contractor of the
respondent for the construction of a school building at Kumbalam in Kollam
under the name and style "St. Joseph International Academy". It was
alleged that disputes and differences arose between the parties on account of
what is described as the obstinate attitude of the respondent to allow the
applicant to complete the work, which had neared completion. It was claimed
that the applicant had carried out works in seven part bills whereas the
respondent had paid only two third. The balance amount was due under the bill.
Since the balance amount remained unpaid, the windows, which had been supplied
by the applicant to the respondent, had to be taken back and deducting the
value of those windows, the balance amount was due to the applicant. According
to the applicant, in order to avoid payment of the due amount the respondent
sought to terminate the contract. The disputes and differences, which were thus
arisen, are to be settled by resorting to arbitration proceedings.
If there are any dispute relating to any
matter regarding the construction of the building or any matter related to this
contract, the Manager, St.Joseph's International Academy, Kollam will be the
sole Arbitrator for such purpose and his decision shall be final, and the
second party will have no right to challenge this decision in the court of
law". It was submitted that as per clause 17, the Manager of the
respondent is to be the sole arbitrator. However, since disputes have arisen on
account of the actions and inactions of the Manager himself, he is not entitled
to function as arbitrator since the same will be against the fundamental
principle of natural justice, nemo debet esse judex in propria causa (no one
shall be a judge in his own cause).
It was under such circumstances that the
applicant sent a letter indicating a panel of three names for selection of one
among them as arbitrator by the respondent. The respondent's Advocate sent a
reply without selecting any of the nominee arbitrators but suggesting for
appointment of two Civil Engineers, one to be appointed by each party who could
jointly verify the records and files and assess the quantity and quality of the
work done in order to avoid litigation and to come to a fair settlement.
The applicant obliged and appointed his
nominee. The respondent also appointed its Engineer. The applicant requested
both the Engineers to take up the assignment and pave way for a settlement.
However, the applicant called for nominee Engineer of the respondent, furnished
all measurement books, and connected records and made necessary follow up,
nothing materialized. Meanwhile, the applicant's nominee Engineer met with an
accident and passed away. Hence, no useful purpose will be served by waiting
further and that is the circumstances under which the applicant has filed this
application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
invoking the statutory appointment procedure of arbitrators.
The contentions of the respondent are as
follows:
The arbitrator who was appointed by the court
under the order (Sri. E.K. Muraleedharan, Retired District and Sessions Judge)
was incapable of acting as arbitrator between the parties in the light of the
legal bar under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
It was submitted that contrary to what has been projected the Manager envisaged
under the arbitration clause who was to act, as the sole arbitrator in the
event of disputes and the signatory to the agreement are the same person. In
order to convince the court that the Manager of St.Joseph’s International
Academy and the executants to the agreement are the same, the applicant has
produced an agreement, but that does not contain the last page of the
agreement. The last page will disclose that the Manager was not the executant
of the agreement. On the contrary, the executant of the agreement was the
General Manager. It was pointed out that it will be seen that there was a
typing mistake where the first party was indicated and instead of General Manager,
the word Manager was mistakenly used. Since the party noticed the mistake at
the time of execution of the agreement, the first party to the agreement, the
General Manager, St.Joseph's International Academy did not sign and instead he
signed as the General Manager only where the first party was indicated. This
was deliberately and intentionally done in order to avoid confusion as the Manager;
St.Joseph's International Academy was appointed as the arbitrator under agreement.
It was submitted that there was absolute consensus with regard to the
arbitrator by both parties to the agreement. It was then contended that the
General Manager and the Manager of St.Joseph's International Academy are two
different persons. A certificate issued by Mr.Joseph J. who was the Manager of
St.Joseph Academy during the period of five years was produced. The present
Manager of St.Joseph Academy was one S.Sundaresan and a certificate issued by
him was produced.
During which, the respondent was claiming a
sum from the applicant on various counts and requested that if the claim was
disputed the matter be referred to the Manager, St, Joseph's International
Academy who was the sole arbitrator. In the reply affidavit filed by the respondent
to the counter filed by the applicant, it was submitted that the respondent has
never acted in a capacity as the Manager of St. Joseph's International Academy
at any stage. This was because of the fact that at the time of construction of
the school, the organization was at a very nascent stage and therefore the
respondent was styled as General Manager and later as Managing Director/Director.
Similarly the then Manager Joseph John was styled as Manager and subsequently
he continued as Manager who was also styled as Administrator. He continued to
be the Manager as well as Administrator. It was submitted that the respondent
(applicant) was trying to take advantage of a typing mistake made in the
agreement wherein the word Manager was used in the last page instead of General
Manager.
The contentions of the applicants are as
follows:
However, it was submitted that there is no
scope for such confusion as in the last page; it was the General Manager who
had signed at the portion where the first party is indicated. In the agreement,
the first party is described as General Manager. Hence, there is no scope for
confusion. Referring to the correspondence produced by the respondent it is
submitted that the Manager Mr.Joseph John had signed on behalf of the General
Manager and not in his capacity as the Manager of the school. It was reported
that Joseph John has functioned only as Manager and that the respondent has
never styled or functioned as Manager. It was further pointed out that the
present Manager was not Joseph John but Mr. S. Sundareswaran and therefore
there was no question of any prejudice being caused to the respondent.
The applicant counsel submitted that the
non-production of the last page of Annexure was not fatal. The Arbitration
Scheme and the Kerala Arbitration Rules required production of the arbitration
agreement only along with the arbitration request and not the whole contract
agreement. Reference was made to Section 7(2) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act in this context. According to the applicant counsel, this was
why the applicant produced only clause 17, which is the arbitration clause. It
was submitted that on behalf of the applicant it has been made clear that it
was Sri. George Fernandez who signed the agreement in the capacity of the Manager,
first party and disputes have arisen on account of actions and inactions on the
part of Sri. George Fernandez, the signatory which were denied.
Respondent maintained that the agreement was
signed by the Managing Director and that the arbitrator was Manager. Mr. Varghese
(applicant counsel) submitted that the witness Joseph.J. was only the
Administrator and his full name Joseph John is indicated and highlighted that
in the reply affidavit it is admitted that Joseph. J. alias Joseph John turned
to be the administrator. The letter pad shows that he was only
"administrator" and not "Manager". If so, his successor,
the signatory also can be only an administrator and not the Manager, which
means that there was no Manager to function as arbitrator. This according to
Mr. Varghese is precisely the reason why the respondent said that the matter /
all relevant papers would be placed before the arbitrator and the matter will
be decided by him. He submitted that those documents are fabricated and cooked
up. He pointed out that the title "to whom it may concern" (sic) is
conspicuous. He submitted that the same mistake is repeated, though created and
signed on different dates.
By issuing such certificates both the
signatories to prove their allegiance to respondent, making themselves
disqualified to be independent and impartial arbitrator which is required under
section 11(8)(b) of the Act even assuming that any one of them can be
considered as arbitrator. Mr. Varghese argued that actual bias is not necessary
to be proved and that the knowledge at the time of appointment does not debar
from applying on the ground that the arbitrator to be appointed in terms of the
agreement may not be impartial. For this proposition, he relied on the Law of
Practice of Commercial Arbitration by Mustill and Byod. He further relied on
commentaries contained in Comparative International Commercial Arbitration by
Julian D M Lew QC and others. He relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court
in ACE Pipeline Contracts (P) Ltd. v. Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. (2007), Bihar
State Mineral Development Corp. and others. v. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd. (2003)
and in Tata Cellular v. UOI (1994) in support of various propositions canvassed
by him.
Sri. Madhu Radhakrishnan, learned counsel for
the respondent relied on the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Pragati
Engineering (P) Ltd. v. T.N. Water Supply & Drainage Board, AIR 1992
Calcutta 139 to argue that where the parties entered into a contract with their
eyes open and knew that the nominated arbitrator is an employee of one of the
parties, none of the parties to the agreement should be allowed to allege that
such nominated arbitrator being an officer of one of the parties to the
contract, would be biased or is likely to be biased. Mr. Madhu Radhakrishnan
relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in International Airport Authority
of India v. K.D. Bali, (1988) to argue that the apprehension of bias must be
judged from a healthy, reasonable and average point of view and the request for
removal of the appointed arbitrator is not to be granted lightly. Mr. Madhu
Radhakrishnan placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jain
Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., (2006) also. The provisions
contained in sections 12 and 13 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
incorporate grounds for challenge and the challenge procedure against and in respect
of arbitrators will reveal that partiality and bias or circumstances giving
rise to justifiable doubts regarding the impartiality and independence can be valid
grounds for challenging the appointment given to a certain persons as
arbitrator. At the same time, a party should not be allowed to wriggle easily
out of agreements entered into by them with open eyes.
Judge Held:
The submissions from both sides were heard. In
the instant case, it was seen that the applicant had agreed to the appointment
of a person in the service of the opposite party as an arbitrator in the event
of disputes. That being the position the Judge would have been ordinarily
reluctant to accept the opposition of the applicant to the appointment of the
nominated arbitrator on ground of bias and partiality. After all, it was a
quasi-judicial function, which was being discharged by the arbitrator whose
proceedings will be regulated by the provisions of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act. His award will be subjected to judicial scrutiny though on
limited grounds and to a limited extent.
However, in the instant case the Judge was
not inclined to dismiss the arbitration request and to appoint the nominated
arbitrator as the arbitrator for resolving the disputes, which have admittedly
arisen between the parties because it is seen that the respondent also became
agreeable to the idea of the disputes between the parties being resolved by
persons other than the arbitrator nominated under the agreement. The parties
had nominated an Engineer each and were willing to have the disputes between
them resolved by a joint perusal of the relevant records by these two
Engineers. To that extent, the Judge opined the respondent has waived his right
to insist that the arbitrator to be appointed has to be the arbitrator
nominated under the agreement. Moreover, in his opinion no prejudice whatsoever
will be occasioned to the respondent by appointing a Retired Judicial Officer
known for his learning and integrity as the arbitrator for resolving the disputes,
which admittedly subsist. Therefore, without deciding the issue whether
appointment of the nominated arbitrator will be vitiated due to reasons of bias
and partiality he allowed the arbitration request and appointed Sri.E.K.Muraleedharan,
Retired District and Sessions Judge, presently at Ernakulum as arbitrator for
settling all the claims and counter claims raised by the applicant and the
respondent in the arbitration request. The arbitrator will enter on arbitration,
make, and publish his award without undue delay.
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