Tuesday, October 30, 2012


Union of India -vs- Singh Builders Syndicate 2009(2) Arb. LR 1 (SC)
The Supreme Court has held that the cost of arbitration can be high if the Arbitral Tribunal consists of retired Judge/s.  When a retired judge is appointed as arbitrator in place of serving officers, the government is forced to bear the high cost of arbitration by way of private arbitrator’s fee even though it had not consented for the appointment of such non-technical non-serving persons as arbitrator/s.  There is no doubt a prevalent opinion that the cost of arbitration becomes very high in many cases where retired judge/s are arbitrators.  The large number of sitting and charging of very high fees per sitting, with several add-ons, without any ceiling, have many a time resulted in the cost of arbitration approaching or even exceeding the amount involved in the dispute or the amount of the award.  When an arbitrator is appointed by a court without indicating fees, either both parties  or at least one party is at a disadvantage.  Firstly, the parties feel constrained to agree to whatever fees is suggested by the arbitrator, even if it is high or beyond their capacity.  Secondly, if a high fee is claimed by the arbitrator and one party agrees to pay such fee, the other party, who is  unable to afford such fee or reluctant to pay such high fee, is put to an embarrassing position.  He will not be in a position to express his reservation or objection to the high fee, owing to an apprehension that refusal by him to agree for the fee suggested by the arbitrator, may prejudice his case or create a bias in favour of the other party who readily agreed to pay the high fee.  It is necessary to find an urgent solution for this problem to save arbitration from the arbitration cost.  Institutional arbitration has provided a solution as the arbitrators’ fees is not fixed  by the arbitrators themselves on case-to-case basis, but is governed by a uniform rate prescribed by the institution under whose aegis the arbitration is held.  Another solution is for the court to fix the fees at the time of appointing the arbitrator, with the consent of parties, if necessary in consultation with the arbitrator concerned.  Third is for the retired judges offering to serve as arbitrators, to indicate their fee structure to the Registry of the respective High court so that the parties will have the choice of selecting an arbitrator whose fees are in their ‘range’  having regard to the stakes involved.  What is found to be objectionable is parties being forced to go to an arbitrator appointed by the court and then being forced to agree for a fee fixed by such arbitrator.  It is unfortunate that delays, high cost, frequent and sometimes unwarranted judicial interruptions at different stages are seriously hampering the growth of arbitration as an effective dispute resolution process.  Delay and high cost are two areas where the arbitrators by self regulation can bring about marked improvement.
D.Saravanan, Chairman
Council for National and International Commercial Arbitration (CNICA)

Friday, October 26, 2012


The Supreme Court on 6th September, 2012 had delivered the much awaited Constitutional Bench judgment by taking a refreshing and encouraging view regarding Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996  (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) by overruling the earlier views. The earlier observations in Bhatia International vs Bulk Trading S.A. and Venture Global Engineering vs Satyam Computer Services Ltd had jeopardized the position of the Foreign Investors and Corporates and placed India in a bad light with respect to International Commercial Arbitration.
Before going through the questions of law raised and the fresh current views of the Constitutional Bench, we need to understand as to why Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism is vital, especially to commercial disputes. In a developing nation such as India, economic reforms cannot become fully effective, if the law dealing with settlement of domestic and international commercial disputes remained out of sync with such reforms.
In Bharat Aluminium vs Kaiser Aluminium, the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice of India has overruled the views taken in Bhatia International and Venture Global Engineering (supra) and put to rest the confusion created by those rulings.
To recap the earlier views, in Bhatia International and Venture Global Engineering the Supreme Court held that the Part I of the Act ,  shall be applicable even  to the arbitration that takes place outside India. Consequently Indian courts attained jurisdiction to pass interim reliefs as contemplated under Section 9 of the Act. Further Indian courts entertained the applications challenging the foreign arbitral award even on merits contemplated under Part I of the Act.
In order to reconcile the view of both the judgments, the Constitutional Bench had analyzed the troubled Sections of the Act in its fullest length and breadth and carried out a fine comparative analysis with judgments of other nations. The Constitutional Bench has observed that Arbitration Act has accepted the ‘territoriality principle’ of the Model Law and the ‘seat’ is the center of gravity. 
Part I and Part II of the Act has been analyzed separately. Let us go through the important aspects and analysis of the judgment in brief. Sections 1 (2), 2 (1)(e),(2),(4),(5),(7),(20) and (28)(1)(a) of Part I and Sections 45, 48 (1)(e) of Part II have been analyzed to understand the scope, object and ambit of the aforementioned sections. It was observed that the Act is a consolidated Act of three acts namely Protocol Act, 1937, Foreign Awards Act, 1961 and Arbitration Act, 1940.
In its judgement on Konkan Railways, the Supreme Court observed that the Act and the Model Law are not strictly identical. The model law, judgments, literature are not a guide to interpretation of the Act. Keeping this in view, it was analyzed that the word “only” missing in Section 2(2) of the Act is not an instance of CASUS OMISSUS. It was also observed that it was neither the judicial option nor a compulsion of the Court to supply the words and interpret.
The Bench further went on to observe that the seat of arbitration is intended to be its ‘center of gravity’. However, center of the gravity does not mean that all the arbitration proceeding must be held in the seat initially agreed by the parties. Any changes in the seat during the process of the arbitration proceedings will not affect the status of the “seat” initially agreed by the parties. Hence, the missing word “only” in Section 2(2) does not detract from the territorial scope of its application.
The need for  interpretation of Section 2(4) & (5) was the usage of wordings "apply to every arbitration" and "all arbitrations" respectively and whether these wordings necessarily include the arbitration that takes place outside India and also on the applicability of  Part I to such arbitrations. The Bench observed that the phrase "all arbitrations" has to be read as limited to all arbitrations that takes place within India. The two sub-sections merely recognize that apart from the arbitrations which are consensual between the parties, there may be other types of arbitrations which are mandatory by statutes as it is  under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1886, Electricity Act, 2003 etc. Hence, this cannot be a ground for applicability of Part I.
On analysis of Section 2(7) in the context of Section 2(f), the Bench observed that the term "domestic award" can be used to distinguish from "International award" and "foreign award". Domestic Award made in India is purely domestic in context. "International Award" shall mean an award from an arbitral tribunal which is domestically seated [in India] for an International Commercial Arbitration. Further, where the parties select a seat outside India, an award from such foreign seated arbitral tribunal will be called a "foreign award".
Further it was observed that, the term ‘subject matter of arbitration’ cannot be confused with ‘subject matter of the suit’ as contemplated under Section 2 (1)(e). “The legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and the courts where the arbitration takes place” hence the reference in the provision is to identify the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. The need for identification of courts is essential because in an agreement parties may agree at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. In such a case, the courts where the arbitration takes place is required to exercise its supervisory control over the arbitral process.
The Bench has further clarified and distinguished the difference between “seat/place” and “venue” in arbitration while analyzing Section 20 in context with Section 2(2). Firstly “venue” is not synonymous to “seat” in an arbitration agreement. The ‘seat/place’ of the arbitration is the place where parties by agreement agree to have the arbitration proceedings. Further, during the course of the arbitral process the tribunal may shift from place to place according to arbitrators, witnesses and parties convenience, for spot visit etc. Apart from the agreed ‘seat/place’, wherever the arbitral tribunal sits that spots can be called as ‘venue’. However, the Bench observed that, the change in the place of meeting for further process or at the convenience of the parties, arbitration and witnesses, will not change or affect the ‘seat/place’ of the arbitration. “The seat of the arbitration remains the place initially agreed by or on behalf of the parties”. Hence, even in a hypothetical situation, if a foreign arbitral tribunal has one or more sitting in India for their convenience, it would not attract the applicability of Part I, though one of the parties may be Indian National.
Further it was observed and upheld from Conflict of Law Rules as quoted in Dicey & Morrirs that, “where the parties have failed to choose the law governing the arbitration proceedings, those proceedings must be considered, at any rate prima facie, as being governed by the law of the country in which the arbitration is held, on the ground that it is the country most closely connected with the proceedings.”     
Collectively, the Bench observed that, the ‘seat/place’ is the center of gravity of the arbitration and hence “if the parties choose another country as the seat of arbitration, inevitably they import an acceptance that the law of that country relating to the conduct and supervision of arbitrations will apply to the proceedings”. Therefore, if the parties select ‘seat/place’ outside India for the purpose of arbitral process, Part I of the Act shall not apply, though the parties might have opted Indian Law and Arbitration Act, 1996 as their substantive law.
The Bench has examined the choice of substantial law and procedural law in the context of Section 28 of the Act. The law governing the conduct of the arbitration is usually procedural law or curial law or the lex fori. The law governing the contract and the obligation of the parties in whole is substantial law. The Bench observed that, Section 28 makes a distinction between domestic arbitrations and international commercial arbitrations, having its seat in India.
The Bench observed that, “Section 28(1)(a) makes it clear that in an arbitration under Part I to which Section 2(1)(f) does not apply, there is no choice but for the Tribunal to decide “the dispute” by applying the Indian “substantive law applicable to the contract”….”On the other hand, where an arbitration under Part I is an international commercial arbitration within Section 2(1)(f), the parties would be free to agree to any other “substantive law” and if not so agreed, the “substantive law” applicable would be as determined by the Tribunal”. Hence, it was concluded that the Parliament was not with the intention to give an extra-territorial operation to Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996.    
Part II of the Act:
It was observed that the regulation of arbitration consists of four steps (a) the commencement of arbitration; (b) the conduct of arbitration; (c) the challenge to the award; and (d) the recognition or enforcement of the award.
Further it was observed that the Part II, unlike Part I of the Act, has no provisions regulating the conduct of arbitration nor the challenge to the award. Hence, the regulation of conduct of arbitration and challenge to an award would have to be done by the courts of the country in which the arbitration is being conducted. Such a court is then necessarily being the supervisory court which was possessed of the power to annul the award. It was upheld that, “it follows from this that a choice of seat for the arbitration must be a choice of forum for remedies seeking to attack the award”
One of the most important aspects in the judgment, while analyzing Section 48(1) (e) observed that, the country in which the award was made is “First Alternative” and the courts under the law of which the award was made is “Second Alternative”. Further, “the words suspended or set aside in Section 48(1)(e) cannot be interpreted to mean that by necessary implication the foreign award sought to be enforced in India can also be challenged on merits in Indian Courts”
Therefore, a foreign arbitral award shall be recognized and enforced by virtue of Sections 48 and 49 of Part II of the Act. However, vide this judgment the Supreme Court has made it clear that, Indian Courts will not have the jurisdiction to challenge the foreign arbitral award on merits. It is only the courts of the country where the seat of the arbitration has been held will have the jurisdiction by exercising its ‘supervisory powers’ over the arbitral process.
Interim measures etc. by Indian Courts where the seat of arbitration is outside India:
It was observed that, “when parties voluntarily select/choose the seat of arbitration to be outside India, they are impliedly also understood to have chosen the necessary incidents and consequences of such choice”. Hence, the Indian courts cannot import the provisions meant under Part I of the Act especially Section 9 for any such interim measures, wherein the seat of the arbitration is outside India. The parties cannot maintain Inter-Parte Suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 pending arbitration abroad for interim measures and suit under Specific Relief Act, 1963 for grant of temporary / perpetual injunction since the primary requirement for filing a suit is a rise of ‘cause of action’ and initiation of arbitration proceedings cannot be construed as ‘cause of action’.     
The Constitution Bench concluded that, the Part I of the Act would have no application to International Commercial Arbitration held outside India and there can be no overlapping or intermingling of the provisions contained in Part I with Part II of the Act. The Judgments of Bhatia International and Venture Global Engineering were overruled. The law laid down by this judgment shall apply prospectively, to all the arbitration agreements executed hereafter.
There are some serious concerns such as there is no provision for any sort of Interim relief in Part II in the Act etc. considered by the Supreme Court in this judgment, however the Bench observed that if at all there is a gap or lacuna, it would be for the Parliament to rectify the same. Such a task cannot be undertaken by the Court and thus it is a wake-up call to the Parliament.
To achieve the economic reforms contemplated by attracting foreign investors it is necessary that the alternate dispute resolution mechanism both by domestic and international arbitration should be revisited by making the necessary changes and amending the provisions of the Act.   

Sukumar .A
Associate at Fox Mandal & Associates, Bangalore
Author, Arbitration – Law and Applicability 


Channulal Chandrakar –vs- Chhangalal & others 2012(2)Arb.LR 18 (DB) Chhattisgarh

The parties to the arbitration agreement were real brothers, who entered into arbitral agreement for distribution/partition of the movable and immovable properties.  The parties had appointed Arbitrators, who had passed an Award.  The Award was challenged on the ground that it was not properly stamped and was not registered under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908.   The award was set aside   against which an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench.  The Division Bench has set aside the order of Court below and passed a judgment in terms of the Arbitral Award as provided under Section 17 of Arbitration Act, 1940.  While passing the judgment in terms of the Award, the Division Bench has held that the Court below should not have entertained the application to set aside the Award as it was barred by limitation.  The Division Bench has further held,  by relying upon the  judgment of Apex Court, in the case of N. Khadervali Sagar (Dead) by LRs  –vs- N. Gudu Sahib (Dead) 2003(1) Arb. LR 647 (SC) wherein it was held that the document which records the settlement, an award, does not require registration under Section 17 of the  Registration Act, 1908 since the document does not transfer or assign interest in any asset and hence there is no question of payment of stamp duty.  In the instant case, it was held that  since it was the settlement of the properties between parties who were real brothers, no stamp duty or registration was required.

Wednesday, October 24, 2012


The Shakti Bhog Foods Ltd.,  hereinafter referred to as “Petitioner” filed a suit before the III Additional District and Sessions Court, Kakinada, Andhra Pradesh claiming damages against M/s.Kola Shipping Ltd., hereinafter referred to as “Respondent”.  The Respondent issued a notice appointing Mr.Alan Okley as their Arbitrator. The Petitioner sent a communication to the Respondent denying the existence of agreement and declined to appoint an Arbitrator.  Thereafter, the Respondent filed an application u/s 45 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to refer the parties to arbitration in London.  Thereafter, the Respondent requested the Petitioner to appoint an Arbitrator and in the event of failing to appoint an Arbitrator, Mr. Alan Okley would be the Sole Arbitrator.  The District Court allowed the application filed u/s 45 and referred the parties to arbitration in London.  Against which the Petitioner preferred a Civil Revision Petition before the High Court of  Andhra Pradesh which came to be dismissed.  Thereafter, the Respondent sent a letter to the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley requesting him to act as a Sole Arbitrator as the Petitioner was not willing to appoint his Arbitrator.  Against the order of dismissal of Civil Revision Petition, the Petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India.  That be so, the Respondent filed a statement of claim before the appointed Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley.  Upon which, the Arbitrator Mr.Alan Okley sent a communication to the Petitioner directing the Petitioner to file a statement of defense.  Upon which, the Petitioner’s Advocate sent a letter to the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley requesting for extension of time for filing the statement of defense.  Thereafter, the Petitioner sent a communication to the Respondent that the arbitration proceedings should not be continued pending S.L.P.  Finally, the Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P. filed by the Petitioner and directed the parties to go for arbitration in London.  Thereafter, the Petitioner nominated Mr. Ramaswamy as Arbitrator, which was disputed by the Respondent.  Thereafter, the Respondent sent a letter to the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley requesting him to reconfirm his appointment as Sole Arbitrator.  Upon which, the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley sent a communication to the Petitioner confirming that he has accepted the appointment  as Sole Arbitrator and that he has ordered the Petitioner to file the defense submissions within a particular day failing which the final and voluntary order would result which would carry severe sanctions.  Upon which, the Petitioner sent a communication to the Counsel for the Respondent disputing the validity of appointment of Mr. Alan Okley as Sole Arbitrator which communication was marked to the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley.  To which the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley replied stating that his appointment as a Sole Arbitrator was in accordance with the law and agreement.  Thereafter, the Petitioner made an application challenging the constitution of Arbitral Tribunal.  Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an application Section 14 r/w Sections 17(3) and section 24 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Court for terminating the mandate of the arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley.  The said application was contested by the Respondent stating that the Petitioner has subjected himself to the arbitration by seeking time to file the statement of defense.  The Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley rejected the application of the Petitioner and stated that he would be proceeding to the final arbitral award, if the Respondent would make an application.  Upon which, the Respondent requested the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley to pass pre-emptory  order directing the Petitioner to serve the defense and counter claim.  However, the Petitioner requested the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley to avoid decision of the Court in the application made by them u/s 14 r/w with sec.17 (3) and 24 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for terminating the mandate of Arbitrator.  However, on the same day, the arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley passed final and pre-emptory order as requested by the Respondent.  Thereafter, the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley fixed the hearing in London.  The Petitioner did not participate in the arbitration proceedings.  On the other hand, the Respondent filed his written submission which was not provided to the Petitioner.  Based on the written submissions and evidence provided by the Respondent and upon oral hearings, the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley proceeded with the arbitration proceedings and passed an Award of 11.02.2009.  The said Award was challenged before the Delhi High Court on various grounds, including the contention that the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley failed to disclose that he had acted as Co-Arbitrator of the Respondent in a related dispute between the Respondent and the head owner of the vessel.  Finally, the Delhi High Court was pleased to hold that the constitution of Arbitral Tribunal with  Mr. Alan Okley was  invalid and such award is liable to be set aside u/s 34(2)(a)(v) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as the Arbitrator Mr. Alan Okley failed to disclose the material fact concerning his appointment as the Arbitrator involving the Respondent which gives rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence on a collective reading Section 12(3), 13(5), (34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.  


(Bharat Omen Refineries Ltd., -vs- Mantecn Consultant, 2012(2) Arb. LR 482 (DB) BOMBAY)
The Arbitration Agreement specifically contemplates that the Award should be made in writing and published by the arbitrator within two years after entering upon the reference or within such extended time not extending further twelve months.  The parties to the arbitration had advanced their arguments on 21.04.2006.  After a considerable delay, the Arbitrator wrote a letter on 14.03.2006 to the respondent that he is trying to publish the Award by 31.03.2006 and in any case latest by 30.04.2006 and that the Arbitrator requested the respondent to send him a Stamp Paper of Maharashtra State for Rs.100/- preferably by 23.03.2006 to publish the Award.  The Arbitrator wrote another letter on 19.05.2006 to the parties stating that he had received a call from the respondent who had requested the Arbitrator to publish the Award as quickly as possible.  By the said letter the Arbitrator stated that he could not publish the Award within 30.04.2006 as he had drafted the Award in respect of certain claims and he is expected to complete the Award of other claims shortly and publish the final Award on 31.03.2006.  Thereafter, the Arbitrator published the Award on 17.08.2006.  The said Award was challenged by the respondent u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and that the learned single Judge was pleased to set aside the Award on the ground that the Arbitrator becomes functus officio as the Award was not made within the stipulated time as mandated under the arbitration agreement.  Against which an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench of Bombay High Court wherein the Division Bench was pleased to confirm the order of the learned single Judge holding inter-alia that the jurisdiction of Arbitrator depends upon the Arbitration Clause in agreement itself; after conclusion of arguments, sending a stamp paper to Arbitrator is nothing but a ministerial act on the part of the respondent and it cannot be said to be effective  participation in arbitration proceedings;  simply because the respondent has provided a stamp paper or might have entered into telephonic conversation with Arbitrator itself cannot be treated as an act of waiver or it cannot be construed as an active participation in judicial proceedings before the Arbitrator;  the Award of Arbitrator is against the mandate given to the Arbitrator in the agreement and the subsequent proceeding after conclusion of arguments cannot be said to be legal and valid;   Arbitrator looses his jurisdiction as per the mandate of Section 14 and 15  once agreed time is lapsed and the said defect is incurable unless both the parties agreed by a fresh agreement in writing giving authority to the Arbitrator to declare the Award even after the stipulated time in furtherance of the original agreement;  implied consent cannot confer jurisdiction once the agreed period is lapsed;  once the agreed period is lapsed, the Arbitrator could have and/or might have refused to pass the Award or terminate the arbitral proceedings suo moto; or could have asked the consent of parties for extension of time;  the delay by the Arbitrator in passing the Award itself is misconduct;  parties cannot be deprived of their right to challenge the Award on the ground that there is a delay of 2 years and 4 months and Award as declared after such a long period can be challenged u/s 34 and finally the Division Bench dismissed the appeal confirming the order of setting aside the Award by relying upon the judgment reported in the Judgment of Supreme Court of India in the case of N.B.C.C. Ltd., -vs- J.G. Engineering Private Ltd. [2010(1) Arb.LR 165 S.C]

Monday, October 22, 2012



ACC Limited (formerly known as the Associated Cement Co. Ltd.) Vs. Global Cements Ltd.


Their Lordship Justice Mr.K.S. Radhakrishnan and
Mr.Jagdish Singh Khehar.JJ

The parities to the dispute entered into an agreement dated 16.12.1989 which contained the following arbitration clause "21. If any question or difference or dispute shall arise between the parties hereto or their representatives at any time in relation to or with respect to the meaning or effect of these presents or with respect to the rights and liabilities of the parties hereto then such question or dispute shall be referred either to Mr. N.A. Palkhivala or Mr. D.S. Seth, whose decision in the matter shall be final and binding on both the parties."
A dispute arose between the parties after the demise of both the named Arbitrators. The named arbitrators were Chairman and Directors respectively of the company. They were appointed considering their eminence, impartiality and familiarity of commercial transactions and commercial laws. They can not be replaced by any other person was the argument placed by the appellant in the application preferred under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 by the respondent before the Hon’ble High Court at Bombay.
The Hon’ble Bombay High Court took the view that the arbitration clause constitutes was valid and that the court cannot, when there is no express prohibition, presume that a vacancy of the named arbitrator cannot supplied by the Court under section 11 of the Act.  
The Apex Court after going through the facts of the case, Sections 14 and 15 of the Act and various the judicial precedence came to the following conclusions:-
a)      The words “at any time” has to be interpreted contextually and reasonably taking note of the intention of the parties.
b)      In the present arbitration agreement the words “at any time” had nexus to the reference of dispute and not to the life time of the named arbitrators.
c)       Further clause 21 of the agreement did not prohibit or debar the parties in approaching the court for substituting an arbitrator on the vacancy of the name arbitrators.  
d)      The view of the Bombay High Court was upheld.

BY G.Ashokapathy 
Secretary General and Co Founder

Wednesday, July 4, 2012

Fostering Cultural Intelligence and the Art of ADR

A Synopsis

Cultural intelligence is inherent to an individual. There should be a reason to improve cultural intelligence on a general notion. The inherent skills, which are determined by one’s culture, equip the individual with unique and exclusive qualities. Cultural inheritance influences social change to a greater extent. Thriving hard in one’s own culture most often results in unknown practices while the others who slightly stay detached from the hardcore cultural practices, experience a better slot adapting to the social standards in general. The skills of ADR come as a technique fostered by the cultural intelligence on most occasions.
Although cultural intelligence comes as a natural instinct, there is a wider scope to understand and inherit the cultural intelligence by learning such trait from others by generally observing and focusing them on low-pressure situations. Being judgmental in most occasions might end up being inaccurate and stereotypic. The trait of inculcating a very high standard set of ADR skills will not only render a status of resolved disputes but on the other hand results in a day to day solution of harmony. It is important that one understands the new environment in true sense to focus on the situation more accurately. Hanging on to a wrong foot, miscommunication or misinterpretation ends up in an awkward move and perhaps, the ways and means to avoid this is to interact effectively with an utmost sense of clarity. Trust building is the most useful concept, which stands throughout the process of dispute settlement and helps parties by paving way to reach their goals.
This synopsis shall form the base for the study session to be held on 13/07/2012 and chaired by Ms. Harshitha Ram